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California's New Marijuana Law:
A Sailing Guide
for Uncharted
Waters

BGa
.e

By Gerald F. Uelmen

On July 9, 1975, Governor Brown signed
Senate Bill No. 95, and California joined the
growing ranks of states' which have dramatically reduced the penalties for possession and
use of small quantities of marijuana. Eleven
weeks later, on September 26, 1975, the
Governor signed Senate Bill No. 268, providing for a mandatory sentence of five years to
life imprisonment for anyone convicted of
selling or offering to sell more than one-half
ounce of a substance containing heroin, and
2
California became one of the few states
which have disinterred harsh mandatory
sentences as a means of controlling drug
traffic. Thus, California drug laws now reach
to two extremes on the spectrum of punishment, depending upon the drug: possessing or

[Oregon was the first state to reduce the penalty for
possession of a small quantity (less than I oz.) of
marijuana to a fine in 1973. During the past year, similar
legislation was enacted in Alaska, Colorado, Maine and
Ohio.
2Cf McKinney's Consol. Laws of N.Y. Penal Law
§220 ff.
JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1976

transporting less than one ounce of marijuana
is punishable by a maximum of a $100 fine;
selling more than one-half ounce of a
substance containing heroin is punishable by
a mandatory prison sentence of five years to
life. Both new laws took effect on January 1,
1976, and are certain to have a dramatic
impact upon future operations in every aspect
of the California criminal justice system. The
purpose of this article is to assess the impact of
these new laws and identify some of the
problems that they will create for judges,
prosecutors and defense attorneys who will be
struggling with their application.
Senate Bill No. 95:
Possession and Use of Marijuana.
1. Reduced Penalties
The chart which appears as Table 1
summarizes the new penalties for the various
offenses, contrasting them to the penalties for
other regulated drugs. Certainly the most
dramatic and widely publicized change in the
law is the reduction of the maximum penalty
for possession of one ounce or less of
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marijuana from a possible 10 year prison
sentence to a fine of not more than $100 (§
11357(b)).3 Even where possession is of a
quantity greater than one ounce, the maximum penalty has been reduced to no more
than six months imprisonment in the county
jail, and/ or a fine of no more than $500 (§
11357(c)).
Similar reductions in penalty are also in
store for those who "give away" or "transport" less than one ounce of marijuana. These
offenses will be punishable by a fine of not
more than $100 (§ 11360 (c)). Previously,
California drug laws recognized no distinction between "sales" and "gifts" of drugs,
treating all transfers alike. The distinction
between a "sale" or "gift" is likely to become a
frequently litigated issue, turning upon
"whether any consideration is given or to be
'4
given in exchange for the marijuana.
Apparently, the giving away of marijuana in a
"friendship" context is a much more frequent
transaction than its sale. It has been reliably
estimated that 71 per cent of less than monthly
smokers have never bought marijuana, but
5
received it from a friend.
The maximum penalty of a five year to
life prison sentence remains in the California
Health and Safety Code for sale of any
quantity of marijuana, or for giving away or
transporting more than one ounce (§ 11360
(a)). This creates a very vivid contrast, in
which the distinction between a "gift" and a
"sale," or the distinction between transfer of
less than one ounce or more than one ounce,
can mean the difference between a $100 fine or
life imprisonment. Such distinctions are
seldom "black and white," and the lack of a
"middle ground" in the law will certainly
create problems if prosecutorial discretion is
not wisely and -uniformly applied. These
problems were avoided in the Oregon law by
providing that any transfer of marijuana
could be punished as either a misdemeanor or
a felony (10 year maximum) in the discretion
6
of the sentencing judge.
3

Unless otherwise noted, all section numbers refer to
the provisions of the California Health & Safety Code, as
amended
by S.B. 95. Stats. 1975, Ch. 248.
4
Legislative Counsel's Digest, S.B. 95 (1975).
5
E. Goode, The Marijuana Smokers, (1970) p. 255.
616 Oregon Rev. Stat., §167.207 Subd. 2 (1973).
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Quantitative Issues
With the quantity of marijuana becoming pivotal, we can expect to see two issues
being consistently raised. First, what should
be weighed? Marijuana commonly contains a
mixture of all parts of the cannabis plant, and
occasionally other plant substances such a
parsley or tobacco may be mixed in as well.
Defendants will be heard to argue that nonuseable cannabis seeds and stalks, and
substances from plants other than cannabis,
should be separated before the weigh-in.
relying upon cases which have held nonusable residue cannot be used to establish
possession. 7 Prosecutors. will counter by
pointing to the statutory definition of marijuana, which includes "all parts of the plant
Cannabis Sativa L., whether growing or not
[and]

the seeds thereof.

.

.," although it

specifically excludes "the mature stalks of the
plant" and "the sterilized seed of the plant

7

People v. Villabolos, (1966) 245 Cal.App. 2d 561;
People v. Leal, (1966) 64 Cal. 2d 504.
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which is incapable of germination. '8 These
exceptions, which recognize and protect the
legitimate use of hemp stalks for rope and
sterilized marijuana seeds as canary food,
may present serious problems for police
laboratories, which are ill-equipped to analyze seeds to ascertain if they are "capable of
germination," or to trace the origin of plant
substances to the stems rather than the stalks.
The legislative history of S.B. 95 offers little
guidance as to how this issue should be
resolved, but the drastic penalties reserved for
quantities greater than one ounce suggest a
very strict approach to measurement. 9 Secondly, will it be a defense for a defendant to
assert that he honestly believed he was in
possession of less than one ounce, when in fact
he possessed more than one ounce? The
statute makes no suggestion that knowledge
of the quantity possessed is an element of the
crime. Can such a requirement be implied? In
a related context, it has been said that "a
mistake of fact relating only to the gravity of
an offense will not shield a deliberate offender
from the full consequences of the wrong
actually committed." 10 While the difference
between less than one ounce and more than
one ounce affects only the "gravity" of the
offense, the difference in degree of punishment is so extreme that it bears greater
resemblance to the difference between conduct which is "innocent" and conduct which is
"criminal."' "I Thus, a good faith belief that the
quantity possessed was less than one ounce
should be recognized as a valid defense.
Escalator Clause Out
One unique characteristic of California
drug laws has been the "escalator clause" by
which the penalties reserved for second and
third offenders are greatly increased. With
respect to the penalties for possession, giving
away, and transporting less than one ounce of
marijuana, this pattern has been abandoned.

8Cal. Health & Saf. Code §11018 (West Supp. 1975).
9
See People v. Coles, (N.Y, Sup. Ct., May 29, 1975)
17 Crim. L. Rptr. 2282.
'5 People v. Lopez, (1969) 271 Cal.App. 2d 754,
holding that defendant's reasonable belief recipient was
over 21 would not be a defense to charge of furnishing
drugs to a minor.
"Cf. People v. Hernandez, (1964) 61 Cal. 2d 529.

Multiple offenders will face no more than the
same $100 fine they faced on their first
conviction. Even second and third offenders
possessing more than one ounce will face no
greater penalty than the six months in jail
and/or $500 fine proscribed for first offenders. There is a provision, limited for some
unexplained reason to the offense of simple
possession of less than one ounce of marijuana, that one who has three prior convictions
within the previous two years shall be
"diverted" pursuant to Sections 1000.1 and
1000.2 of the California Penal Code (§
11357(b)). The real effect of this provision,
however, is to reduce the penalty for fourth
offenders, since Penal Code § 1000.2 provides
for dismissal of the charges upon successful
completion of the "education or treatment
program" to which the defendant is diverted.
As an alternative, if the defendant is not
accepted for or refuses to accept diversion, the
only penalty which can be imposed is the same
$100 fine specified for all other offenders.
Amended Offenses
Three other offenses that previously
applied to marijuana use have been amended,
so their application will be limited to drugs
other than marijuana: (1) The offense of
possession of pipes or other devices used for
smoking or injecting controlled substances
(§11364); (2) The prohibition of knowingly
visiting or being in a room or place where
controlled substances are being smoked or
used (§ 11365); and (3) The crime of using or
being under the influence of a controlled
substance (§ 11550). Thus, mere use of
marijuana, apart from its possession, is no
longer any crime at all in California. 12 It may
take some ingenuity, however, to devise a way
to use it without possessing it!
Cultivating Penalty Same
One offense that remains untouched by
the new law is the crime of cultivation of
marijuana, (§ 11358), still carrying a penalty
of one to ten years. The "grow your own" cult
has achieved great popularity in California,
with detailed guides for the care and feeding

2However, public intoxication by marijuana can
still be punished under Penal Code §647 (f).
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Contract vs. TortYour options
are rapidly expanding.
When a large and powerful corporation unreasonably delays or refuses to honor a contractual obligation, it may end up having to pay
sulbstantial awards, including adequate compensation for emotional distress and an assessment
of punitive damages. This is the unmistakable
message from a series of recent decisions in
many jurisdictions.

ments? Do you fully appreciate their implications? If the right case came along, would you
be able to bring a successful action for adequate
compensatory and punitive damages?
The new Second Edition of John C. McCarthy's
PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN BAD FAITH CASES
is the only complete and practical guide to the
law and practice of this important, fast-growing
area of the law. It clearly explains the principles
and concepts ... sets forth the cases and statutes in point . . . suggests effective tactics and
strategies ... tells how to evaluate a potential
case. In addition, it provides scores of checklists,
model pleadings, interrogatories, jury instructions and other useful forms.

Plaintiff's potential recovery has been enormously expanded in bad faith suits based on the
wrongful breach of such contracts as insurance
policies, leases, employment agreements, escrow
conditions, loan agreements, conditional sales,
and trust deeds. New areas are opening up at an
extraordinary pace.
Are you familiar with these important develop-

In eight comprehensive chapters, Mr. McCarthy
-along with several leading trial lawyers. who
have participated in the landmark cases in the
field-discusses such subjects as: bases of liability; compensatory damages; punitive damages; recognizing a bad faith case; client interview and investigation; discovery procedures;
trying the case; post-trial strategy; scores of
additional subjects.
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in several leading cases for punitive damages
and bad faith. He is with the law firm of
John C. McCarthy, Incorporated, with
offices in Los Angeles. and Claremont,
California. A recent U.C.L.A. Law School
Alumnus of the Year, Mr. vMcCarthy has
lectured widely on the.subject of bad faith,
as well as on environmental la W.
.
To order an
approval copy of
this valuable new
book, without cost
or obligation, simply
fill in and mail the
coupon today.

This new book-already in thousands of law
offices only weeks after publication-should
prove invaluable to tort and business lawyers.
Order your approval copy today.

-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -------------TO: Lawpress Corporation
P.O. Box 760
Tiburon, Calif. 94920 (415) 924-9595

;

Please send me PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN BAD FAITH CASES .....
$34.50 (plus $2.07 tax in Calif.) If not fully satisfied, I may return the book within 30
days of receipt for full credit or an immediate refund.
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LC # 75-32849
Hardbound,
461 pages
Semi-annual
supplementation
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of cannabis plants being commercially published and sold. Back country hikers
frequently stumble upon miniature marijuana
plantations in out of the way meadows. Now
that the risks of cultivating and growing
marijuana are so much greater than simply
purchasing it in small quantities, we might
expect "home grown" marijuana to decline in
popularity-but no such effect has been
reported in Oregon.
2. Concentrated Cannabis
Hashish is extracted from resin scraped
off the flowering top of the cannabis plant. It
can be smoked or eaten, and is thought to be
about five to eight times as potent as
marijuana.13 California law has never treated
hashish or other forms of concentrated
cannabis differently than marijuana. Marijuana was defined to include "the resin
extracted from any part of the plant,"' 4 and
one who possessed or sold hashish was liable
to the same penalties imposed for less potent
forms of marijuana. This comes to an end
with the new marijuana law. Simple possession of any amount of "concentrated cannabis" may be a felony or misdemeanor, in the
discretion of the sentencing judge, with a
maximum term of one to five years in state
prison (§ 11357 (a)). Transfer or transportation of "concentrated cannabis" carries the
same five year to life term reserved for sale of
marijuana.
"Concentrated cannabis" is defined as
"the separated resin, whether crude or
purified, obtained from marijuana." (§
11006.5). Thus, in addition to hashish, such
exotic concoctions as "ganja," a combination
of resin with the leaves and flowering tops of
the cannabis plant, would be included.
The effect of this change in the law upon
the use patterns of marijuana as opposed to
hashish will be interesting to observe. The rise
in the popularity of hashish was attributed to
stepped up efforts to control the illegal
importation of marijuana-hashish being less
bulky and easier to smuggle in. 15 Whether the

3

1 Delong, Dealing With Drug Abuse: A Report to
the Ford
Foundation, (1972) p. 97.
14 Cal. Health & Saf. Code §11018 (West Supp.
1975).
1SE. Brecher, Licit & Illicit Drugs, (1972) p. 443.

greater risks of possessing hashish as opposed
to marijuana will result in a decline in its
popularity remains to be seen.
Species Definition
The legal definition of "concentrated
cannabis" may create a renaissance for the
"species defense." This defense, recently
asserted in many marijuana cases, was based
on the contention that the marijuana plant is
actually at least three different species of
plant: Cannabis Sativa L., Cannabis Ruderalis, and Cannabis Indica. 16 The statutory
definition of marijuana in California Health
and Safety Code § 11018 refers only to the
plant "Cannabis Sativa L." In dried crushed
form, it is virtually impossible to tell which
species of the plant marijuana came from.
Nonetheless, in People v. Van Alstyne, 17 the
Court held that the § 11018 definition
included all species of the marijuana plant.
The Court expressed its confidence that
"[h]ad the possibility that marijuana is
polytypical in species been called to the
attention of the Legislature, we are satisfied
that the Legislature. . .would have adopted a
new [definition] that expressly included all
newly-recognized species."' 8 A warning,
however, was implicit in the final paragraph
of Justice Cobey's opinion: ". . .while the
legislative intent behind Section 11018 is, to
our mind, perfectly clear, and was expressed
in words entirely adequate in 1972 to convey
that intent, scientific advances have since
rendered these words obsolete for that
Continued on page 75

16See Fullerton & Kurzman, The Identificationand
Misidentificationof Marijuana,(1974) 3 Contemp. Drug
Problems 291.
1746 Cal.App. 3d 900 (1975). Accord: United States

v. Walton, - F.2d - (D.C.Cir. 1974). Contra: United
States v. Lewallen, 385 F.Supp. 1140 (E.D.Wis. 1974);
F.Supp.
United States v. One 1966 Chevrolet Sedan, £M, 14 Cr.L. 2387 (S.D.Fla. 1974).
1846 Cal.App. 3d at 917. The Court apparently
overlooked the fact that the Legislature had recognized
the existence of another species of marijuana in Health &
Safety Code §26254, enacted in 1939, regulating the
labeling of a number of drugs, including "cannabis
indica." When this section was repealed in 1970, and
replaced by Health & Safety Code §26634, the reference
to "indica" was dropped, and only "cannabis" is listed,
suggesting that the 1970 Legislature was well aware of the
multiplicity of species, and capable of resolving the
ambiguity created by this diversity.
CALIFORNIA STATE BAR JOURNAL
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fewer legal entanglements will result from
their use, and the more inclined attorneys will
be to utilize the advantages of this modern
method of recording testimony.
Conclusion
The time has come for trial lawyers to
take bold strides with the advances in
available technology. Hopefully, the advantages which Ohio has experienced with video
taped testimony will bring about early
adoption by California of legislation permitting video taped trials. Michigan experiments
have shown that video taping eliminates the
"trial-of-the-trial" conducted by court and
counsel on evidentiary questions, with all of

its potentialities for jury confusion. Video
taped trials, utilizing video taped deposition
testimony, offer the opportunity to conduct
this phase outside of the jury's presence, and
to conduct it with adequate time to research
precedent and avoid erroneous rulings.
At the very least, it is time for California
and other states to take the small step of
permitting video tapes to be used in lieu of
traditional stenographic reporting during pretrial depositions, with a view toward developing experience among bar members in the use
of this, after all, not very new medium.

MARIJUANA LAW
Continuedfrom page 32

purpose. In our opinion, section 11018 as now
worded constitutes a potential trap for the
unwary and, the Legislature would be well
advised to rewrite the section so that it plainly
says what it means. Otherwise enforcement of
the policy of the section will be imperilled."' 19
The warning went unheeded: not only does
the new marijuana law make no change in the
legal definition of marijuana, it incorporates
that definition in defining the newly proscribed substance "concentrated cannabis."
Newly enacted Health and Safety Code
§ 11006.5 defines "concentrated cannabis" as
"the separated resin, whether crude or
purified, obtained from marijuana." Since
marijuana is still defined in § 11018 as the
plant Cannabis Sativa L., the argument will
be made that only hashish derived from this
species of plant is included in the proscription.
The argument may have an even stronger
basis in the context of hashish use, as
compared to marijuana. Since most marijuana grown in North America is apparently of
the species Sativa L., 20 it may be fair to
assume that crushed marijuana found in this
country was not derived from one of the more
exotic species, such as Indica or Ruderalis,
21
which are indigenous to the Middle East.

Much of the hashish found in this country,
22
however, is imported from the Middle East,
creating a substantial likelihood it may have
been derived from a species other than
Cannabis Sativa L.
The use of the term "resin" to describe
hashish has also been criticized as ambiguous,
since different compounds will be extracted
from the plant depending upon which solvent
is used in the extraction process. 23 By not
limiting the definition of "concentrated
cannabis" to resin which includes the pharmacologically active ingredient of marijuana,
tetrahydrocannabinols, the Legislature may
have included harmless substances having no
psychoactive effect.
3. Destruction of Arrest and Conviction
Records
Three principle provisions of the new law
relate to destruction of arrest and conviction
records. First, all those arrested for or
convicted of possession of marijuana, regardless of amount, or giving away or transporting
less than one ounce of marijuana, will have
their record of arrest and/or conviction

22

E. Brecher, Licit and Illicit Drugs, (1972) p. 443.
Stein, Laessig & Indriksons, An Evaluation of

23

19(1975) 46 CaI.App. 3d at 918.
2
oSee note 15, supra.

Drug Testing Procedures Used by Forensic Laboratories
and the Qualifications of their Analysts, 1973 Wisc.

2lid.

L.Rev. 727, 769.
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automaticallyexpunged, by destruction of the
record, after two years (§ 11361.5(a)).
Secondly, all those who were arrested for or
convicted of possession of marijuana, regardless of amount, prior to January 1, 1976, may
petition the Superior Court for the county in
which the arrest or conviction took place, to
have the records pertaining to the arrest or
conviction destroyed (§ 11361.5(a)). Destruction is mandatory once the court determines
that the arrest or conviction for simple
possession of marijuana did occur. The
petitioner is required to pay the costs of
destruction of the records, up to a maximum
of $50. No exception is noted for those who
are still serving probationary or prison
sentences pursuant to the conviction they seek
to expunge, nor is the two year waiting period
imposed upon convictions occuring after
January 1, 1976 applicable to convictions
prior to that time. Thirdly, once an arrest or
conviction record is destroyed, either automatically or upon petition, no public agency
can rely upon the arrest or conviction as
grounds to "alter, amend, assess, condition,
deny, limit, postpone, qualify, revoke, surcharge, or suspend any certificate, franchise,
incident, interest, license, opportunity, permit, privilege, right, or title." (§ 11361.5(c)).
Presumably, the conviction record can be so
used during the two year period before
expungement. If so, this provision may offer
little consolation to the school teacher who is
dismissed for two years. If the only purpose of
the two year delay is to preserve the rather
weak sanction for multiple offenders, it makes
little sense to condition the prohibition of
public reprobation upon prior destruction of
the record.
Courts Flooded
The breadth of these provisions is
staggering, when one contemplates the
approximately 50,000 arrests that have been
made for marijuana possession in each of the
past five years in California. 24 A literal flood
of petitions from the victims of these arrests
and subsequent convictions can be expected
to deluge the California courts.

In other states where wholesale statutory
expungement or reduction of prior sentences
has been attempted, courts have held these
provisions invalid on the ground that the
power of clemency or commutation is
constitutionally vested exclusively in the
executive. For example, the Texas legislature,
as part of a statutory reduction in penalties for
marijuana possession, included a provision
permitting all those previously convicted of
marijuana offenses to petition the court in
which they were sentenced for "resentencing"
in accord with the new law. This provision
applied regardless of whether the offenders
were presently serving a sentence, were on
probation or parole, or had been discharged
from a sentence.2 5 In State ex rel Smith v.
Blackwell,26 the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals found this provision unconstitutional, as a violation of Article IV, Section 11 of
the Texas Constitution, which provides:
"In all criminal cases, except treason and
impeachment, the Governor shall have power,
after conviction,. . .to grant reprieves and
commutations of punishment and pardons."
Governor's Power
Since the new law resulted in a reduction of
sentence for previously convicted offenders, it
was held to infringe upon the power of
commutation exclusively vested in the governor. A similar position was taken by the
Colorado Supreme Court, interpreting a
Constitutional provision very similar to that
of Texas. 27 These cases are particularly
significant, because the California constitutional provision relating to reprieves, commutations and pardons is virtually identical to
that of Texas and Colorado:
"Subject to application procedures provided
by statute, the Governor, on conditions the
Governor deems proper, may grant a reprieve,
sentence,
pardon, and commutation, after
28
except in case of impeachment.
This raises two issues: (1) Is the
expungement provision of the new marijuana

2571 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat., Article 4476-15 (Vernon

Supp. 1975).
24

California Bureau of Criminal Statistics, Crime
and Delinquency in California, 1972.

26(1973) 500 S.W.2d 97.
27People v. Herrera,(Colo. 1973) 516 P.2d 626.
28

Cal. Const., art. V, §8.
CALIFORNIA STATE BAR JOURNAL
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law the equivalent of a "reprieve," "pardon"
or "commutation?" (2) Is the pardon power
vested exclusively in the governor?
A "pardon" has been defined as an
exemption from punishment and a removal of
any disqualifications or disabilities which
would ordinarily have followed from the

conviction.2 9 While an "expungement" has
virtually the same effect, certain collateral
effects of conviction have been preserved;
most notably, government*employment and
licenses can be denied on the basis of the
defendant's conviction despite its expungement. 30 Procedurally, the pardoning power
3
can be exercised only after conviction. '
Expungement, on the other hand, has the
effect of voiding the conviction by judicial
dismissal of the accusation filed against the
defendant. 32 At least as applied to past
convictions, the provisions of§ 11361.5 of the
new marijuana law thus go further than
previous expungement provisions, in expressly prohibiting the denial of government
employment or licenses, and in providing that
an actual record of a valid conviction be
destroyed. Thus expungement 'is virtually
indistinguishable from a pardon. Similarly,
there is no meaningful distinction between a
"commutation" and an expungement of a
conviction upon which a defendant is still
serving the sentence.
Constitutional Question
Whether the pardon power is exclusively
vested in the governor is an unsettled question
in California. 33 In People v. Odle,34 the
Supreme Court limited the effect of Penal
Code § 1260, providing an appellate court
may "reduce... the punishment imposed," to
situations where it finds errors relating to the
punishment imposed by the trial court. The

29People v. Biggs, (1937) 9 Cal.2d 508, 511.
30
See Note, The Effect of Expungement on a
CriminalConviction (1967)40 So.Cal.L.Rev. 127; Baum,

Court noted that "to construe the Section
otherwise would give the court clemency
powers similar to those vested in the governor, and raise serious questions relating to the
separations of powers." 35 Previous enactments of the Legislature granting "expungement" 36 have avoided the problem by providing that the court retroactively enter a verdict
of not guilty and vacate the judgment of
conviction, so the process differs from a
pardon-the court is simply exercising its
continuing jurisdiction over the defendant.
The new marijuana law ignores such procedural niceties: the record of conviction is
simply destroyed. Thus the stage may be set
for a full scale constitutional test of the
exclusiveness of the governor's power of
pardon.
4. Procedural Rights of Offenders
Those arrested for possessing, giving
away or transporting less than one ounce of
marijuana cannot be taken into custody and
booked by the arresting officer (§ 11357(b)).
Upon presentation of satisfactory evidence of
identity, and giving a written promise to
appear in court, the defendant must be
released by the arresting officer. The procedure to be followed in issuing the notice to
appear is described in California Penal Code
§ 853.6, as amended by S.B. 95.
Just as in the case of a traffic ticket, the
defendant will be able to dispose of the case
without ever appearing in court-simply by
posting the amount of bail fixed by the
magistrate, then failing to appear. California
Penal Code § 853.6 provides that, after
forfeiting bail, the magistrate "may in his
discretion order that no further proceedings
shall be had." The only exception, requiring a
personal appearance by the defendant, is
where he has previously been convicted of the
same section-but even then, the magistrate
can declare no further proceedings upon
finding undue hardship will be imposed upon
the defendant by requiring him to appear.

Wiping Out a Criminal or Juvenile Record, (1965) 40

Cal.State Bar J. 816.
3
'Calif. Const., Art. 5, §8; People v. Brunner, (1973)
3d 908.
32 Cal.App.
32
See Cal. Penal Code §1203.4 (West 1972).
33
This question was noted, but not reached, in In Re
Collie, (1952) 38 Cal.2d 396.
3437 (1951) Cal.2d 52.

3537 Cal.2d at 58.
3
6Cal. Penal Code §§1203.4, 1203.4a (West 1972).
See Baum, Wiping Out a Criminal or Juvenile Record,
(1965) 40 Cal.State Bar J. 816.
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When and if the defendant does appear in
court, it will in all likelihood be without a
lawyer. (Who would hire a lawyer when all
that's at stake is a fine of $100?) At this point,
we might ask whether the defendant will be
entitled to have the public defender appointed
to represent him? And whether the defendant
is entitled to a trial byjury? Since one purpose
of S.B. 95 was, ostensibly, "to unclog the
courts," it would seem inconsistent with that
purpose to require appointment of counsel
and jury trials for cases involving no more
than a $100 fine. Yet, apparently that is
precisely what the Legislature did!
Misdemeanor vs. Infraction
Constitutionally, neither the appointment of counsel 37 nor a jury trial 38 are
required when a defendant is charged with an
offense not punishable by a jail sentence.
Consistent with these rulings, the California
Penal Code defines an "infraction" as an
offense which is not punishable by imprisonment, and provides:
"A person charged with an infraction shall not
be entitled to a trial by jury. A person charged
with an infraction shall not be entitled to have
the public defender or other counsel appointed
at public expense to represent him unless he is
arrested and not released on his written
promise to appear, his own recognizance, or a
deposit of bail." 39
Both the right to appointed counsel and jury
trial have been held applicable to those
40
charged with misdemeanors in California.
Section 17 of the California Penal Code
provides that all crimes which are not felonies
(punishable by imprisonment in the state
prison) are misdemeanors, "except those
offenses that are classified as infractions."
Thus, it would seem logical that the new
offenses of possession, giving away or
transporting less than one ounce of marijuana, being punishable by no more than a $100
fine, would be treated as infractions. Nonetheless, in defining each of these offenses, the
Legislature declared the violator "is guilty of a
misdemeanorand shall be punished by a fine

of not more than $100." That this departure
from the ordinary scheme of classification
was a deliberate and conscious choice of the
Legislature is readily apparent. First, any
description of an offense as felony, misdemeanor or infraction is unusual, since most
penal provisions simply specify the penalty.
Thus, the specific use of the word "misdemeanor" indicates the Legislature's intent
that this offense not be treated as an
infraction. Secondly, the Legislature's intent
to provide a right to jury trial appears from
the provision for diversion of fourth offenders, in which it is required that the three
prior convictions be charged and "found to
be true by the jury upon a jury trial."
(§1 1357(b)). Apparently, this step was taken
in the belief that the classification of "misdemeanor" would carry a stronger flavor of
disapprobation of marijuana use then merely
calling it an "infraction."
Fourth Amendment Protection
There may be justification other than
linguistic gamesmanship for treating these
offenses as misdemeanors, rather than infractions, despite their light penalty. The appointment of counsel at least insures that some
attention will be paid to the circumstances
under which the marijuana was seized. If
defendants were not entitled to appointment
of counsel, it is unlikely that they would ever
raise Fourth Amendment objections in
marijuana possession cases, and the limitations which the constitution imposes upon
police searches could quickly become a dead
letter in marijuana possession casesprecisely the kind of cases where the protection may be needed most.
5. Effect Upon Diversion Programs
During each of the past two years,
pursuant to the provisions of California Penal
Code §§ 1000-1000.2, approximately 25,000
defendants charged with drug offenses have
been "diverted" to treatment programs in lieu
of prosecution. Seventy-seven per cent of
these cases have involved simple possession of
marijuana. 4 1Assuming most of these marijua-

37

Argersinger v. Hamlin, (1972) 407 U.S. 25.

38
Duncan
39

v. Louisiana, (1968) 391 U.S. 145.
Cal. Penal Code §19c (West 1972).
1n Re Masching, (1953) 41 Cal.2d 530; Mills v.
Municipal Court, (1973) 10 Cal.3d 288, 298.
40

4 Report, State Office of Narcotics and Drug Abuse,
Penal Code Section 1000: The Drug Offender Diversion
Program (August, 1975).

CALIFORNIA STATE BAR JOURNAL

HeinOnline -- 51 Cal. St. B.J. 36 1976

na possession cases involved less than one
ounce, 42 a sizable reduction in the flow of
defendants into diversion programs can be
anticipated. While diversion remains available in all marijuana possession cases, it can
be anticipated that most defendants will
prefer to 'simply pay the fine. An attempt to
estimate the size of this reduction was made
by the State Office of Narcotics and Drug
Abuse, which recently surveyed prosecutors
and probation departments. Estimating that
only 20 per cent of marijuana possession cases
involve more than one ounce, it was predicted
that diversion caseloads may decline as much
as 60 per cent. 43 Some of the slack may be
picked up by the expanded eligibility for
diversion resulting from the enactment of
A.B. 1274, which became effective January 1,
1976, and which added several new offenses to
the list of divertable offenses contained in
44
Penal Code § 1000.
6. Effect Upon Juveniles
Since approximately one-third of arrests
for marijuana possession in California involve juveniles,4 5 an important question arises
as to the effect of the new legislation upon
juvenile court proceedings. The answer,
apparently, is none. Juvenile Court jurisdiction over juvenile marijuana users is posited
upon § 602 of the California Welfare and
Institutions Code, which provides:
"Any person who is under the age of 18 years
when he violates any law of this state. . .defining crime. . is within the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court, which may adjudge such person
to be a ward of the court."
Thus, regardless of whether marijuana

42

Based upon a nationwide sample, the National
Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse estimated
that 67 per cent of all state marijuana arrests were for
possession of less than one ounce. Marijuana: A Signal of
Misunderstanding, (1972) (First Report of the National
Commission on.Marijuana and Drug Abuse), p. 111.
431 Joint Newsletter, P.. 7 (State Office of Narcotics
and Drug Abuse,. June 1975).
44The following offenses are added to Penal Code
§1000 by A.B. 1274: Health & Safety Code §11358
(Cultivation of. Marijuana); §11550 (Being Under
Influence of Controlled Substance); Penal Code §381
(Inhaling Fumes);. 647 (f) (Public Intoxication by Drug);
Business & Professions Code §4230 (unauthorized
Possession
of Prescription).
45
California Bureau of Criminal Statistics, Crime
and Delinquency in California, 1972.
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possession is classified as a felony, misdemeanor or infraction, it is still a "crime," and
brings a juvenile within the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court.
Nor would the provisions for issuing
"citations" to offenders, rather than taking
them into. custody, have application to
juvenile offenders. Under § 625.1 of the
Welfare and Institutions Code, a police
officer can take a minor into temporary
custody without a warrant whenever he has
reasonable cause to believe the minor has
committed a public offense in his presence.
B. Senate Bill No. 268: Sale of Heroin.
1. Mandatory Prison Sentences
Senate Bill No. 268 literally sailed
through the Legislature, sweeping through
the Assembly 70 to I and the Senate 29 to 0. It
was a predictable response to a startling
statistic: 64 per cent of 2,012 convicted heroin
sellers in 1973 received probation. 46 The bill
even received the unprecedented endorsement
of the President of the United States, who
noted in a speech to the Legislature that "here
in California, from the latest figures I've seen,
less than one out of five convicted hard-drug
'47
pushers ever serves time in prison.
The solution to this problem offered by
Senate Bill No. 268 is not a new one:
mandatory prison sentences have frequently
been seized upon as an expedient answer to
crime problems in the past. Yet every
noteworthy study of the past two decades has
condemned this solution as illusory and selfdefeating, 48 culminating in the adoption of the
following standard by the American Bar
Association Project on Minimum Standards
for Criminal Justice:
"The legislature should not specify a mandatory sentence for any sentencing
category or for
49
any particular offense."
The mandatory sentencing provision of

46Los Angeles Times, Sept. 27, 1975, Part 11. p. I.
47

1d.

48Model Penal Code §6.02, comment, pp. 13-14

(Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954); President's Commission on
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. The
Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, p. 143 (1967); Task
Force Report: Corrections 27-28 (1967); Working Papers
of the Nat'l Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal
Laws, Vol. 11, pp. 1251-55 (1970).
49ABA Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures, §2.1 (c).
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Senate Bill No. 268 is contained in new Penal
Code Section 1203.07, which will prohibit the
granting of probation or suspending the
execution or imposition of sentence for three
classes of offenders:
1. Any person convicted of violating §
11351 of the Health and Safety Code by
possessing for sale one-half ounce or
more of a substance containing heroin.
Section 11351 of the Health and Safety Code
prohibits the Possession for Sale of a number
of narcotic drugs in addition to heroin, but
only heroin is encompassed by § 1203.07. 51No
quantity is specified in § 11351 as sufficient to
establish that the purpose of possession was
for sale; the intent to sell can be established by
expert testimony based upon the quantity of
the drug, how it was packaged, the prior
activity of the defendant, and whether or not
he was addicted to the drug. 52 Normally,
possession of one-half ounce of heroin would
be sufficient to establish an intent to sell, since
addicts would seldom have that large a
quantity in their possession for personal
53
use.
2. Any person who is convicted of
violating § 11352 of the Health and Safety
Code by selling or offering to sell one-half
ounce or more of a substance containing
heroin. Section 11352 of the Health and
Safety Code, like Section 11351, encompasses
a number of narcotic drugs in addition to
heroin. It prohibits not only the sale or
offering to sell these drugs, but also the
transporting, importing, furnishing, adminis50
0pium, Opiates such as methadone, Opium
Derivatives such as codeine and morphine, Mescaline,
Peyote, Tetrahydrocannabinols and Cocaine are all
included
within the ambit of §11531.
51
0ne may question whether there is a rational basis
for singling out heroin and classifying it differently than
other narcotic drugs. Cf People v. McCabe, (1971)49
111.2d 338. There are few differences between heroin and
other opiates in terms of potential for addiction. See De
Long, Dealing With Drug Abuse: A Report to the Ford
Foundation,
(1972) pp. 71-85.
52
People v. Newman, (1971) 5 Cal.3d 48.
5
At one grain per dose, one-half ounce of pure
heroin can represent more than 225 individual doses. One
grain is approximately 65 milligrams. Heroin addicts
have been known to develop a very high tolerance to the
drug, however, and some studies have reported addicts
receiving as much as 200 milligrams (three grains) of pure
heroin in a single dose and not batting an eye. Daily
habits of up to 28 grains per day have also been reported.
See Brecher, Licit and Illicit Drugs, (1972) p. 104.

tering or giving away of the drug. Only those
defendants convicted of selling or offering to
sell the drug will be subject to the mandatory
sentencing provisions of § 1203.07, which
means the provision may be unavailable if the
defendant is charged alternatively with
"selling, furnishing and giving away" the
drug, as is currently routine practice in most
prosecutor's offices.5 4 On the other hand, if
the defendant is charged only with "sale" or
"offering to sell," then the "purchasing agent"
defense should be available to the defendant.
This defense, by which the defendant asserts
he was not the actual seller of the drug, but
was merely acting as the agent of the
purchaser in acquiring the drug from someone else and delivering it to the purchaser, 55
would not be available to a defendant who is
charged with "furnishing" or "giving away" a
drug, since one need not be the actual "seller"
56
to commit those offenses.
The inclusion of "offering to sell" onehalf ounce or more means many defendants
may be subjected to the mandatory sentencing
provisions of § 1203.07 simply as a consequence of their own false bravado. Those who
offer to sell frequently boast of their access to
quantities far in excess of reality.
3. Any person convicted of violating
§ 11351 of the Health and Safety Code by
possessing for sale heroin, or convicted
of violating § 11352 of the Health and
Safety Code by selling or offering to sell
heroin who has one or more prior
convictions for violating § 11351 or §
11352 of the Health and Safety Code.
Regardless of the quantity involved, one who
sells, offers to sell, or possesses for sale heroin
will be subject to the mandatory sentence
provisions if he has previously been convicted
of violating either § 11351 or § 11352. The

54

A verdict need not specify upon which of the three
premises, (sell, furnish or give away) the statute was
violated. People v. Pierre, (1959) 176 Cal.App.3d 198.
55
Adanis v. United States (5th Cir. 1955) 220 F.2d
297.
56

Even where one is charged with "sale," however,

the California courts have not been hospitable to the
"purchasing agent" defense, holding the evidence

sufficient to find aiding and abetting a sale. People v.
Guttierez, (1962); 207 Cal.App.2d 529, 531; People v.
Becerra, (1959) 175 Cal.App. 2d 53, 55. But see People v.
Bernal, (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 777, 785.
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prior convictions, of course, need not have
involved heroin, since § 11351 and § 11352
apply to other narcotic drugs as well.
This is not, of course, the first time that
the Legislature has resorted to the mandatory
prison sentence as a means -of dealing with
narcotic offenders. In Section 11370 of the
Health and Safety Code, prison sentences are
mandated for any person convicted of a long
list of drug offenses 57 if they have any prior
felony conviction involving a narcotic drug,
marijuana, peyote or cocaine. The impact of
§11370 has been substantially diluted,
however, by the discretionary power of the
sentencing judge to strike the allegation of a
prior conviction over the objection of the
prosecutor. An attempt to limit that power,
by requiring the concurrence of the
prosecutor before an allegation of a prior
conviction could be struck, 58 was held
unconstitutional as an invasion of the judicial
power of sentencing in People v. Tenorio.59
Although in Tenorio the prior conviction only
had the effect of enhancing the penalty and
did not render the defendant ineligible for
probation, the power to strike a prior has also
been recognized in the context where one
effect of the prior would be to render the
defendant ineligible for probation under §
11370.60

Judiciary Decision
One can certainly question whether the
new mandatory provision of Penal Code
§ 1203.07 will fare any better than the old one
in Health and Safety Code § 11370 when it

57

Those liable for mandatory sentences under §11370
include defendants convicted of violating the following
sections of the Health and Safety Code: §11350
(Possession of Narcotics), § 11353 (Adult Sale of Narcotic
to Minor), § 11355 (Selling Substance Falsely represented
to be Controlled Substance), §11357 (Possession of
Marijuana), §11359 (Possession of Marijuana for Sale),
§11360 (Sale of Marijuana), §11361 (Adult Sale of
Marijuana to Minor); §11363 (Cultivating Peyote),
§ 11366 (Maintaining Place for Sale of Narcotics); § 11368
(Forging Prescription). § 11351 (Possession of Narcotics
for Sale) and § 11352 (Sale of Narcotics) were eliminated
from this list by S.B. 268.
5
1Cal. Health and Safety Code §11718. After the
Tenorio decision. §11718 was repealed. Stats 1972, ch.
1407, §2, p. 2987.
59(1970) 3 Cal. 3d 89.
60hn

Re Gonies, (1973) 31 Cal. App.3d 733.

confronts the independence of the judiciary.
The power to strike priors is clearly bottomed
on the power to dismiss contained in Section
1385 of the Penal Code. As noted in Peoplev.
Burke:6" "The authority to dismiss the whole
includes, of course, the power to dismiss or
'strike out' a part." This principle can be
logically extended beyond prior convictions
as the triggering mechanism. For example,
the allegation that a sale or offer to sell or
possession for sale involved more than onehalf ounce of heroin, which must be established before § 1203.07 can take effect, could
also be struck. Such an allegation would stand
in no better posture than an allegation that a
person used a firearm in the commission of an
offense, which triggers an additional five year
penalty pursuant to Penal Code §12022.5. In
People v. Dorsey,62 the Court held the
allegation of the use of a firearm could be
struck at the time of sentencing if "the trial
court finds that allowing such a finding to
stand would be counter-productive to the
eventual rehabilitation of the defendant and
that such additional incarceration is neither
necessary nor desirable in the handling of that
particular offender."
The statutory manipulation by which
S.B. 268 created Penal Code §1203.07 may
also raise serious questions of equal protection of the laws, by creating artificial and
irrational classifications of offenders who are
or are not eligible for probation. Prior to the
enactment of S.B. 268, all those convicted of
possession for sale (§ 11351) or sale of narcotic
drugs (§11352) who had a prior felony
conviction involving either those drugs or
marijuana were ineligible for probation by
virtue of the provisions of Health and Safety
Code §11370. WhenS.B. 268 removed §11351
and §11352 from the operation of §11370,
however, and placed those offenses under the
operation of new Penal Code §1203.07, it
included only those offenses involving heroin.
Thus, all those who possess for sale or sell any
quantity of the other drugs proscribed in
§ 11351 or § 11352 including opium, morphine,
cocaine, methadone and peyote, remain

61(1956) 47 Cal.2d 45, 51.
62(1972) 28 Cal.App. 3d 15, 18.
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eligible for probation, even if they have
several prior convictions. Those who simply
possess these drugs, or possess or sell less
dangerous drugs such as marijuana, remain
ineligible for probation if they have prior
convictions, by virtue of § 11370 of the Health
and Safety Code. Another anomaly is that
new Penal Code §1203.07 is operative upon
one who sells or possesses for sale heroin,
irrespective of amount, if he has a prior
conviction under §1135f or §11352 of the
Health and Safety Code. The prior conviction
section of Health and Safety Code § 11370 was
much broader, extending to any felony
offense involving specific drugs. Thus, a
defendant who sold one-tenth of an ounce of
heroin would be ineligible for probation
under Penal Code §1203.07 if he were
previously convicted of a sale of one-tenth of
an ounce of heroin to an adult. On the other
hand, the same defendant would be eligible
for probation if his prior conviction was for
selling 10 pounds of heroin to a minor,
because the conviction would be under §
11353 of the Health and Safety Code, rather
than the two offenses specified in Penal Code
§ 1203.07, and the broader prior felony
provisions of Health and Safety Code § 11370
no longer apply.
No rational reason appears for these
classifications, and even applying the most
generous standards of equal protection, it is
unlikely they could withstand a constitutional
63
attack.
2. Aggregate Weight
prison
sentence
The
mandatory
provisions of S.B. 268 are triggered by a sale,
offer to sell, or possession for sale of "one-half
ounce or more of a substance containing
heroin." The significance of this phraseology
can only be appreciated in the context of the
typical pattern of heroin distribution. As the
drug passes from importer to wholesaler to
retailer, it is "cut" or diluted at every stage of
the distribution process. Typically, a "street
ounce" of heroin contains less than 5 per cent
heroin. 64 By defining the cut off point as

63

U.S.

64

Compare Marshall v. United States, (1974)
- 94 S. Ct. 700.
Brecher, Licit and Illicit Drugs, (1972) p. 99.
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aggregate weight, or "one-half ounce of a
substance containing heroin," rather than
pure weight, the degree of dilution becomes
irrelevant: one is equally liable whether he
possesses one-half ounce of pure heroin or
one grain of heroin diluted by one-half ounce
of milk sugar. The explanation for use of this
aggregate weight standard apparently lies in
the difficulty presented to police laboratories
if they were required to do quantitative
analysis, and actually determine the percentage of a drug contained in a substance. It is
much easier to simply determine whether the
substance contains any heroin, than to
ascertain the percentage it contains. Whether
this is ample justification to lump all
possessions of one-half ounce together,
regardless of the degree to which the substance has been "cut," is open to serious
question. The degree of the "cut" directly
corresponds to the level at which one would
65
be in the distribution chain.
Nonetheless, aggregate weight has been
used as the standard in both New York and
New Jersey, and has withstood constitutional
66
challenge in those states.
3. Elimination of Minimum Parole Terms
Senate Bill No. 268 eliminates the
minimum parole terms contained in Sections
11350, 11351 and 11352 of the Health and
Safety Code. These provisions delayed
eligibility for release on parole beyond the
one-third of the minimum normally required
by Penal Code §3049, requiring instead that,
in the case of sale of narcotics, a first offender
serve three years of the five-life sentence, a
second offender serve 10 years of a 10-life
sentence, and a third offender serve 15 years
of a 15-life sentence. Lest we suspect the
Legislature of magnanimity in this gesture,
however, it should be noted that the California Supreme Court had found the 10 year

65

1d. But see Interim Report of the Temporary State

Commission to Evaluate the Drug Laws, New York,
State Legislative Document No. 10, (1972), p. 60,
suggesting the inequity is superficial, because even when
cut to 5%, possession of one ounce "is indicative of major
dealership."
66
United States v. Haynes, (2d Cir. 1968) 398 F.2d
980; State v. McDonald, (N.J. 1966); 224 A. 2d 18; People
v. Cameron, (1973) 73 Misc. 2d 790, 791.
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minimum for parole eligibility contained in
§11352 was unconstitutional, constituting
both cruel and unusual punishment under
Article I, Section 6 of the California Constitu67
tion, in In Re Foss.
In any event, those subjected to the
mandatory prison sentences required by new
Penal Code § 1203.07 will be eligible for
parole after serving the usual one-third of
their sentence.
Minimum parole terms still remain,
however, in the Health and Safety Code
provisions establishing penalties for possession and sale of non-narcotic drugs. 68 In terms
of the rational basis for classification required
by the equal protection clause, it is difficult to
justify a requirement that one selling marijuana must serve three years to a five-life
term, 69 while one serving a five-life term for
sale of heroin is eligible for parole after 20
months.

a penalty of five-15 years imprisonment for a
first offender, 10-life for a second offender,
and 15-life for a third offender.7 0 Those
convicted of sale of heroin face five-life, 10life and 15-life sentences for first, second and
71
third offenders, respectively.
72
the California
In In Re Lynch,
Supreme Court held that a life term for a
second offense of indecent exposure extracted
cruel and unusual punishment, in view of the
nature of the offense, a comparison of the
punishment for other offenses deemed more
serious, and a comparison of how the same
offense is punished in other jurisdictions.
Applying these criteria, a close question is
presented whether the life terms imposed for
these offenses are "cruel and unusual." The
Supreme Court did not reach the question of
the constitutionality of the life maximum in
striking the 10 year minimum for parole
eligibility in In Re Foss.73 Yet, it is clear from

4. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Most of those who fall within the ambit
of the mandatory prison sentence imposed by
new Penal Code §1203.07 will face a maximum term of life imprisonment. Those
convicted of possession of heroin for sale face

"The test is whether the maximum term of
imprisonment permitted by the statute
punishing his offense exceeds the constitutional limit, regardless of whether a lesser
term may be fixed in his particular case by the
Adult Authority."
When made in the context of drug laws,

67(1974) 10 Cal.3d 910. Cf People v. Ruiz, (1975) 49
Cal.App. 3d 739.
6
See Health and Safety Code §§11358, 11359,
11360,
11361, 11377, 11378, 11379, 11380.
69
Health & Safety Code §11360.

70

In Re Lynch 74 that:

Health & Safety Code §11351.
Health & Safety Code §11352.
72(1972) 8 Cal. 3d 410.
7

73

Supra, n. 65.

74(1972) 8 Cal. 3d at 419.
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the cruel and unusual punishment argument
has had mixed reviews in other jurisdictions.
In People v. Lorentzen,7 5 the Michigan
Supreme Court struck down a 20 year
mandatory minimum sentence for sale of
marijuana, and in Downey v. Perini,76 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit found sentences of 10-20 years for
possession of marijuana for sale and 20-40
years for sale of marijuana were cruel and
unusual. However, mandatory life sentences
for sale of heroin and cocaine were upheld by
the New York Court of Appeals in People v.
77
Broadie.
C. Conclusion
With the adoption of both Senate Bill
No. 95 and Senate Bill No. 268 within the
same three month period, the California
Legislature did indeed go "from one extreme
to the other."
Senate Bill No. 95 is a far reaching piece
of legislation, and will certainly result in some
reduction in the caseloads being carried by the
courts, prosecutors, public defenders, and
probation officers, although not as substantial as if the new possession offenses had been
classified as "infractions." The new law also
promises relief from the stigma of an
arrest/conviction record for thousands of
those who were charged under previous laws,
although the reality of that promise may face
a serious constitutional test. The contrast
between the leniency of the new penalty
provisions and the harshness of remaining
provisions of the California drug laws will
certainly create greater pressure for broader
75

(1972) 387 Mich. 167, 194 N.W. 2d 827.
1975)-_ F.2d - 17 Cr.L.Rep. 2324.
N.Y.2d 17 Cr.L. Rep. 2285.

76(6th Cir.
77(1975) -

reform of California drug laws. Finally, the
reduction in penalties will not immunize the
marijuana possession laws from broad constitutional attacks. Shortly after Alaska
enacted new legislation similar to California's, its Supreme Court unanimously held
that any criminal punishment of private use of
marijuana is a violation of the constitutional
right of privacy. 7 8 The Legislature's failure to
amend the basic statutory definition of
marijuana may also provide new grist for the
"species" defense, especially in hashish cases.
All of these problems certainly suggest that
the controversy surrounding the law's treatment of marijuana users has certainly not
been laid to rest with Senate Bill 95.
Senate Bill No. 268 faces an even rockier
road in the courts. Its mandatory sentencing
provisions are likely to fare no better than
previous efforts to impose mandatory sentencing in California when faced with the
progeny of the Tenorio decision. The
irrational classifications of offenders it creates
may run afoul of the equal protection clause.
Its use of an aggregate weight standard is
based upon a questionable premise. And the
life imprisonment it mandates raises a
substantial issue of cruel and unusual punishment. All of these problems certainly suggest
that the solution to the problem of the heroin
seller may lie elsewhere than in the political
expediency of mandatory sentencing.

78Ravin v. State, (Alaska Sup. Ct., May 27, 1975) 537
P.2d 494. The court based its decision upon a State
Constitutional guarantee of privacy very similar to Article
1, §1 of the California Constitution. A test case based
upon the right of privacy was filed in California by the
National Organization for Reform of Marijuana Laws on
October 31, 1975.
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